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Introduction
Adequate housing is considered as one of the basic needs and a human right.
When comparing the extent to which different groups of households are able to meet such basic needs, an analyst faces three main problems. The first problem is the identification problem. In order to identify those who do not meet their basic needs, the analyst must select an adequate threshold under which basic needs are considered not met. In this context, the selection of an adequate variable that characterizes housing services consumed by households remains difficult. The surface of the dwelling in square meters (m 2 ) may be an appealing indicator, however it can be argued that housing quality, proximity to services and location may not be captured by its surface. In this paper, we rely on the market value as it provides a better indicator of housing quality.
The second problem lies in the choice of the aggregation procedure. The analyst must select an adequate index to transpose household's or individual's deprivation into an aggregate measure. The most commonly used income poverty indices are the FGT poverty measures (Foster, Greer, and Thorbecke, 1984) , but other measures can be used as well. The FGT measures can also be applied to other indicators of wellbeing such as child malnutrition or housing deprivation (see among others Bourguignon and Chakravarty, 1999) . To test whether the deprivation ordering depends on the choice of the deprivation index, analysts often perform stochastic dominance tests to ensure that the comparisons remain valid for a wide spectra of deprivation indices and deprivation thresholds (see Atkinson, 1987 , Zheng, 1999 Coulter, Cowell and Jenkins, 1992a) . Also, Banks and Johnson (1994) , Jenkins and Cowell (1994) and Duclos and Mercader (1999) generalize this approach for a class of parametric equivalence scales that are extended to take into account household composition. These papers, along with those of Phipps (1991) , Burkhauser, Smeeding and Merz (1996) , and De Vos and Zaidi (1997), find that international comparisons of poverty and poverty profiles are strongly influenced by the assumptions made on household needs. In this paper, we test (among other things) whether or not the ordinal comparisons of housing deprivation are robust to the selection of the equivalence scale's elasticity.
The objective of this paper is twofold. First, it aims at analyzing the measurement difficulties inherent to housing deprivation comparisons. It also offers an illustration by comparing housing deprivation among demographic groups in Lebanon. Second, it addresses the equivalence scale problem. In a first step, we use Coulter et al. (1992b) framework for analyzing the impact of the equivalence scale elasticity on FGT comparisons. We extend their theoretical result to account for the impact of the equivalence scale elasticity on stochastic dominance comparisons. We then apply this framework to housing deprivation comparisons in Lebanon. In this paper, we adopt a market value approach as an indicator of housing services. To compute the market value of housing services for households who own their dwelling, we use the usual hedonic prices models. One major difficulty arises given the presence of an old Lebanese law that prohibits rent increase on old rent contracts. The presence of such a law implies that some tenants may enjoy an in kind subsidy of rent.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical framework, Section 3 displays our empirical analysis of housing deprivation in Lebanon and Section 4 concludes.
Theoretical framework

Parametric equivalence scales
To perform welfare comparisons across household with different needs, it is a common practice to use an equivalence scale to transform household's income into an equivalent income. The theoretical argument is based on the existence of economies of scale in household consumption. A larger household may thus need a lower level of per capita income in order to achieve the same level of welfare than a smaller household. This argument is particularly valid in the context of comparisons of housing services enjoyed by different households. In our context, the equivalence scale transforms the observed value for total housing services, x, into equivalent housing services, y.
In practice, many equivalence scales have been built. Buhmann et al. (1987) 
where n is the household size, m (n) is the equivalence scale and θ is the equivalence scale elasticity. In the context of housing services, equivalent housing services are defined by
In this setting, the equivalence scale elasticity, θ, is theoretically expected to vary between 0 and 1. When the equivalence scale elasticity is equal to 1, housing services are considered as private good and there are no economies of scale. However, if the equivalence scale elasticity is 0, housing services are considered as a pure public goods and there is no welfare cost of adding one person to the household. For all values between 0 and 1, we consider that there exist some economies of scale in housing services. In practice, the equivalence scale elasticities vary over almost all the theoretical interval. In the context of equivalent income, the thirty-four equivalence scales presented in Buhmann et al. (1987) vary between 0.12 and 0.84.
Housing deprivation indices and ordering
The objective of this section is to describe the theoretical setting in which we perform our analysis. In order to perform our analysis, we need to partition the population set in different family types or regions. Therefore, we will consider only additive deprivation measures. deprivation is given by
where:
Here z, is the threshold under which a household is considered deprived in the dimension of housing services. The function δ (y, z) represents the contribution to total deprivation made by a household enjoying equivalent housing services y. A popular class of additive poverty indices that can be used in the context of housing deprivation is the class of FGT indices, defined as
Other examples of additive indices are the Chakravarty (1983) poverty indices and the Watts (1968) index that is defined as 
where C Note that the continuity condition we impose is more restrictive than that in Zheng (1999) , which only postulates continuity on the interval [0, z) without any restriction on δ (t) (z, z) = 0 for t = 0, 1, ..., s − 2. This difference between his and our assumptions has implications for the analysis developed in this paper. Specifically, we are able to consider dominance criteria for orders greater than two, even when there is significant uncertainty on the value of the lower bounds for the ranges of possible deprivation thresholds. For details, see Duclos and Makdissi (2004) . 
If there is a consensus that the deprivation threshold z should not exceed some maximum, denoted by z + , then it is possible to lay out a necessary and sufficient condition for absolute deprivation dominance applicable to all orders of stochastic dominance. In this framework, Duclos and Makdissi (2004) show that deprivation does not increase in a movement from distribution F to distribution G, for all
If the stochastic dominance test fails at order s, two different strategies may be followed. The first increases the order of stochastic dominance until a deprivation ordering becomes robust over all of some pre-specified ranges of deprivation thresholds. Davidson and Duclos (2000) 
2.3 The impact of the equivalence scale's elasticity on deprivation indices and orderings 
In this framework, we can write
where z n = m (n) · z and π n represents the population share of households of size n. In such a framework, Coulter et al. (1992b) showed that
Equation (12) allows us to conclude that an increase in the value of the equivalence scale elasticity induces an increase of housing deprivation, F GT F (α, z).
This increase may be decomposed into two effects. The first effect given by It is important to note that this critical threshold is a useful tool when stochastic dominance tests fail to provide a robust ordering for
To analyze the impact of marginal changes in θ, it is convenient to decompose stochastic dominance curves into subgroups.
Standard calculus enable us to find that
Analogous results may be obtained for ∂G 
3 Housing deprivation in Lebanon , we use a prediction of the rental value as an indicator of housing quality 5 . Also, for households with a per capita rental value lower than 1% of the mean per capita rental value, we apply a bottom coding procedure that imputes to these observations a rental value equal to this threshold.
Using this information, we compare housing deprivation of different regions and demographic groups: (1) Beirut vs Mount Lebanon and Bekaa, (2) nuclear families vs other families and (3) families having members living abroad vs other
families. Note that we exclude from the regional comparisons North Lebanon, South Lebanon and Nabatieh. These regions have experienced low construction activities in the year following the civil war because of instability. In this case, the rents paid do not adequately reflect housing quality. Using imputed rental value of the household's dwelling, we test whether one group is more likely to live in poor housing conditions than the other. Also families having members living abroad are doing better than other families.
While such an interpretation come in line with conventional wisdom, it could be 4 They own their dwelling or they are provided with free housing or they have moved into their rented dwelling prior to 1992. 5 For 1.9% of total observations in the data set, we have a rent paid that exceeds the predicted value from the regression even if the household had moved in prior to 1993. In those case we used actual rent paid as indicator of rental value.
misleading. In fact, these findings may be sensitive to the choice of the equivalence scale. We will test this possibility later in this section. The second suggests that there is no differences between nuclear families and other families in term of housing achievement. As we will see later, in this particular case, accounting for economies of scale may change this finding.
In Figure 2 
Deprivation Analysis
To identify the poor, we fix the deprivation threshold to half of the mean per capita rental value for households of size 4. This deprivation threshold takes a value of 348,000 Lebanese pounds. In the remainder of the paper, we will normalize rental values by this per capita deprivation threshold. In this context, a value of 1 (100%) is associated with 348,000 pounds and a value of 2 (200%) with 698,000 pounds. Table 2 displays the estimates of household deprivation indices for the country.
As expected, deprivation estimates increase with the elasticity of the equivalence scale. It is important to emphasize that, even if we were confident that our hedonic regression model gives an exact picture of the value of housing services, the measurement difficulty associated with the choice of an equivalent scale re-mains important. We can see in Table 2 that for the selected deprivation threshold, poverty incidence varies between 2.14% (for θ = 0) to 21.98% (for θ = 1). Table   3 displays the derivatives of deprivation indices. The derivatives seems to be consistent with the increases in estimates. The larger is the derivative in one point, the larger is the increase in the estimate induced by an increase in the equivalence scale elasticity.
Focusing our attention on differences in deprivation among geographic areas, we try to determine the extent to which housing deprivation is lower in Beirut. . If the stochastic dominance curves do not intersect before z = 300%, we obtain a robust ordering of deprivation for a given value of θ. Figure 3 displays first order stochastic dominance tests for various choices of θ. There is obviously less housing deprivation in Beirut than in the rest of the country and this conclusion seems to hold for any value of the deprivation threshold, any deprivation index and any value of the equivalence scale elasticity.
Turning our attention to differences in deprivation among families with and without members living abroad, we try to answer another question: Are families with members living abroad less deprived in term of housing than other families? Table 5 displays the estimates of deprivation indices for families with members living abroad and for other families. Looking at Table 5 , we note that for any values of α and θ, deprivation is lower for families having member living abroad.
Once again, the conclusion drawn from the density curves of housing services and family sizes seems to be verified. Also, we perform stochastic dominance tests to check for robustness in measurement assumptions. Figure 4 displays first order stochastic dominance tests for various choices of θ. Obviously, there is less housing deprivation for families having members living abroad. This conclusion seems to hold for any value of the deprivation threshold, any deprivation index and any value of the equivalence scale elasticity.
Finally, we consider differences in deprivation among nuclear families versus other families. Nuclear families are defined as families where we can find a father, a mother and/or children. Other families' structure includes extended families as well as multi-families households. It is important to note that the comparison of these two demographic groups is interesting for methodological considerations. In fact, it helps us illustrate the measurement difficulties that can be associated with a change in measurement assumptions. Unlike the two previous comparisons, this comparison is not robust to a change in analytical assumptions. Table 6 housing deprivation than other families and this ordering is robust. For θ = 0.8 and 1.0, the two stochastic dominance curves intersect at values that are lower than the initial poverty line. As mentioned earlier, two different strategies may be followed. Thus, one can increase the order of dominance to obtain a robust ordering for all values of θ. Alternatively, one can estimate critical deprivation threshold, z s as defined in equation (10) . Table 7 displays the value of z s for the first four orders of stochastic dominance. We note that increasing the order of dominance to s = 4 produces a robust ordering of deprivation between the two demographic groups. Also, a complete ordering of these two groups for s = 1, 2 or 3 and any values of θ, may be obtained only at the cost of restricting the maximum poverty line to 26.1%, 39.5% or 53.1% for order 1,2 or 3 respectively. Table 6 : F GT estimates for Nuclear families and Other families 
